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Abstract 
An economic analysis of policies to control nonpoint source nitrate pollution in the presence 
of minimum river flow restrictions was undertaken. A non-linear bio-physical economic 
optimisation model of an intensively cultivated Scottish agricultural catchment was 
constructed. The presence of minimum river flow controls in the catchment was found to 
reduce nitrogen pollution. However, by themselves, river flow controls were found not to be a 
cost effective means to reduce diffuse pollution. River flow controls did not, for the most part, 
alter relative instrument ranking. 
 
Institutional Affiliation 
Ashar Aftab: Research Assistant, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. 
Nick Hanley: Professor of Environmental Economics, Department of Economics, 
University of Glasgow. 
Athanasios Kampas: Lecturer Department of Agricultural Economics & 
Development, University of Athens. 
David Ogelthorpe: Head of Natural Resource Economics Department, Scottish 




This research was funded by the Macaulay Land Use Research Institute (UK) 
Thanks to Dr. Allan Lilly and Dr. Sara Dunn of Macaulay Land Use Research 





The European Union's Water Framework directive (WFD) requires the integrated 
management of water resources at the catchment level throughout the EU from 2002 
onwards. This implies that the environmental impacts of agriculture be integrated into 
catchment planning, both in terms of water quality and water quantity issues. The 
WFD sets a target of Good Ecological Status throughout Europe and implies the joint 
setting of river flow restrictions (water quantity) and ambient pollution standards 
(water quality). The Directive also requires responsible Agencies to prepare 
catchment management plans which achieve targets cost-effectively, the first time 
such a requirement has been imposed at the EU level, and calls on member states to 
investigate and promote the wider use of economic instruments.  
 
In this paper, we develop a model which allows the estimation of the cost of 
improving water quality (measured by ambient nitrate levels) through a combination 
of on-farm management measures, economic incentives for fertiliser use, and through 
the restriction of irrigation water abstraction by farmers. Restriction of irrigation 
flows is carried out in a manner consistent with attaining minimum ecologically-
acceptable flow levels in our case study river. Empirically, we a) investigate the 
impact of river flow restrictions on agricultural non-point nitrogen pollution control b) 
compare the relative efficiency of policies to control diffuse nitrogen pollution based 
on mean and wet weather conditions, and c) consider "mixed instrument" policies 
which may be more appealing to regulators.  
 
The West Peffer catchment (Scotland) was used as a case study due to its combined 
problems of low flows due partly to irrigation abstractions, and high ambient nitrate 
levels, due mainly to farming activities. Diffuse pollution problems from nitrates, which can result in eutrophication and contamination of potable water supplies has 
been recognised and partially addressed in Scotland (Darcy, et al.; SEPA). Similarly 
there is evidence to support the need for further surface water extraction controls in 
intensively irrigated Scottish catchments due to the ecological consequences of low 
flows (Crabtree, et al.; Fox; Garrod and Willis).  
 
Previous Work 
There is an abundance of literature on the economics of nonpoint pollution control 
(Dosi and Tomasi; Shortle and Horan; Xepapadeas), and some investigation of the use 
of irrigation controls to control diffuse pollution (Booker and Young; Dinar and 
Letey; Helfand; Murillo, Karaj and Martinez; Stevens; Weinberg, Kling and Wilen). 
However, there is no study to our knowledge which empirically investigates the effect 
of imposing minimum river flow restrictions on the control of catchment nitrogen 
pollution.  
 
Comparable work includes that of (Larson, Helfand and House) who found water to 
be the best input to regulate nonpoint source nitrogen pollution from lettuce 
production in California. Whereas Larson et al. varied irrigation water applications 
directly, this study examines the indirect effect of regulating river flows (hence 
irrigation water availability) on diffuse catchment pollution in a wetter  Scottish 
climate. A study of cotton production in California (Stevens)  determined the 
equivalence of taxing nitrogen and irrigation water under certain assumptions (nitrate 
emissions represented nitrogen leaching) but found their fiscal implications to differ. 
However, again no link was made with protecting minimum river flow requirements. 
Finally, a recent empirical study in Spain (Murillo, Karaj and Martinez) concludes that in terms of farmer costs, pricing irrigation water is the most expensive means to 
control nitrogen pollution . Again, however, no explicit link is made with maintaining 
minimum river flows.  
 
We add to this literature by integrating minimum river flow restrictions directly into 
an economic optimisation model of land use, to enable targets for reducing nitrate 
concentrations in the river and minimum river flow rates to be achieved jointly. This 
is viewed as being important in the light of the WFD's requirement for integrated 
catchment management. We also consider the sensitivity of our results to variations in 




Bio-physical simulation modelling can, to an extent, overcome the information 
asymmetry between the principal/regulator and agent/farmer and the regulatory 
inability to observe agricultural pollutant run-off (Weersink, et al.). Much policy 
analysis relies on the use of "second best" standards for environmental resources, set 
through the political process. Examples of such standards include the WFD general 
target of good ecological status, and more specific upper limits for nitrates in water of 
50 mg N/l (or 11.3 mg nitrates/l) contained within the EU Nitrates Directive. A 
challenge facing regulators is to implement the WFD cost-effectively to catchment 
farming, given the need to meet specific minimum river flow requirements.  
 
Our model simulates production activities in the 4,347 farmed hectares of the West 
Peffer catchment in East Lothian, Scotland as one economic decision maker whose objective is to maximise profits. It includes five major arable crops (winter wheat, 
spring barely, winter oilseed rape, main crop potatoes) besides livestock farming 
(dairy, suckler, intensive beef, sheep) and the associated grazing grass/silage 
production.  Over laying G.I.S. mapping of the catchment boundary onto soil survey 
digitised maps yielded the three prevalent soil textures in the catchment (sandy, 
loamy, and silty) and their distribution. Spatial heterogeneity is therefore accounted 
for by the inclusion of different soil textures and multiple outputs (crops and 
livestock) which result in different production and nitrate leaching (Wu). A schematic 
diagram of the model is included as Appendix 2. 
 
Crops were combined in two 4-5 year rotations, i.e. a) spring barley, winter wheat, 
spring barley followed by potatoes on predominantly sandy soils and, b) winter 
wheat, winter wheat, spring barley, followed by winter oilseed rape on loamy and 
silty soils. After consultation with the Agriculture Development and Advisory Service 
(ADAS), since estimating nitrate loss when leys are ploughed out is difficult and 
inaccurate (Lord)  we assumed that all grass grown in the model is on permanent 
pastures (in fact, most grass in the catchment falls into this category). Catchment 
agronomic practices and parameters, crop rotations and the existing baseline scenario 
were deduced from the literature and catchment level farm survey
i data. Transfer 
payment schemes and subsidy incentives for both livestock and arable cultivation 
were also included in the model (SOAEFD 1997a, b). 
 
The farmer’s decision on how much nitrogen to apply is based on crop production 
functions for each crop on the three soil types in the catchment, and the market price 
of the crops and production costs. The model was calibrated to the 1997/98 price level. Nitrogen crop growth functions for each crop/soil combination were estimated 
using ADAS data (Chambers and Johnson), while grazing and silage grass production 
was determined from Scottish Agricultural College data (SAC 1996; SAC 1997). 
Separate nitrogen potato production functions under different flow regimes and 
weather conditions were approximated from (Crabtree, et al.) and ADAS data. 
  
It was assumed that farmers follow the manure and slurry management guidelines 
outlined by Scottish Agricultural College (SAC 1992) and apply these products to 
grasslands only. Estimates of the nitrogen content of different farm animal wastes 
were approximated (SAC 1992). Depending on the most profitable land allocation to 
each crop/soil type and ensuing nitrogen application (including farm manure from 
livestock) the model uses leaching functions to estimate the weekly average leaching 
throughout the year based on the actual rainfall pattern of three ‘stylised’ years 
representing a dry, mean and wet year during the 1989-98 period. These leaching 
functions were obtained by regressing the results of numerous runs of the NITCAT 
model (Lord), for each crop/soil combination within a reasonable range of nitrogen 
fertiliser applications. The IRRIGUIDE model (Bailey and Spackman) was used to 
give crop-dependent weekly values of evapo-transpiration over winter; while elution 
was modelled using the SLIMMER algorithm (Anthony, Quinn and Lord). Grassland 
leaching was estimated using NCYCLE a model developed by the Institute of 
Grassland and Environment Research (INGER). Our model then assumes that the 
nitrogen leachate is transported via drains to the river instantaneously where it mixes 
with the river water. One model output is daily approximations of diffuse nitrogen 
pollution levels over a year.  
Irrigation Controls and Crop Growth 
Irrigation contributes both to potato yield and quality, and up to 65% of potato crop 
land is currently irrigated in East Lothian. The West Peffer catchment is extensively 
used for surface water extraction and is presently subject to abstraction controls (Fox). 
The need for controls arises from the damaging effects of uncontrolled surface water 
extraction on river ecology, wildlife populations, recreational use and amenity values 
during periods of low flow (Willis and Garrod). In practice, the rule operated by the 
regulator is to stop abstractions through licence suspension when river flow falls to 




Hydrological modelling was employed to estimate the amount of water available for 





relative to a situation with no river flow restriction. The timing of this available water 
was inputted into a potato growth model developed by Cambridge University 
(Crabtree, et al.) to give potato crop quantity and quality
iv. Besides the option of not 
irrigating potatoes at all, the modelling process allowed for two irrigation regimes 
termed optimum and restricted. Of the two, optimum irrigation resulted in the better 
quality potato crop with significantly less incidence of disease. Thus the potato and 
irrigation modelling yielded the total acreage of potato crops allowed under optimal 
and restricted irrigation for each river flow restriction under three different weather 
scenarios. These upper bounds on acreage acted as constraints in the economic model 
reflecting the scarcity of irrigation water due to the desire to maintain minimum 
acceptable river flows.   
Economic Modelling of Policy Options 
A non-linear model was written using the General Algebraic Modelling System 
(GAMS) (Brooke, et al.) and solved using the CONOPT II solver (Stolbjerg-Drud)
v . 
Appendix 1 gives a brief mathematical formulation of the model. Overall the model’s 
baseline allocation was very similar to the reported land use data, with the percentage 
deviation between reported data and baseline being -6.37% for arable, -4.63% for 
grassland and -1.64% for setaside land
vi. The policy options we simulated included a) 
nitrogen input and emission taxation, b) nitrogen input quotas c) managerial 
restrictions on stocking density and the area of setaside, and d) various combinations 
or "mixed instrument" packages combining economic incentives with managerial 
restrictions.  
 
Impact of river flow requirements on policy outcomes under current climatic 
conditions 
The impact of a catchment fertiliser tax was simulated by running the model 
iteratively with increasing nitrogen costs under 4 different minimum river flow 
targets, based on mean weather conditions over 1989-98. Figure 1 shows the 
percentage increase in the price of nitrogen required to reduce the number of weeks in 
the year which exceed the standard under 4 different river flow standards, where the 
90
th percentile is the strictest target. It is evident that with irrigation restrictions in 
place the required increase in nitrogen taxation is less than without any river flow 
controls. The more stringent the surface water extraction control, the lower the 
optimal N tax. In other words there is complimentary interaction between N taxes and 
river flow maintenance. Secondly, as the regulator tightens the requirement to meet the water quality standard, the difference in taxation required with and without the 
river flow restrictions increases. Regarding irrigated cropping, by restricting irrigation 
through river flow controls, the regulatory authority lowers the profit per hectare, 
prompting a shift in land allocation from optimal to restricted irrigation, which then 
reduces the incentive to apply as much nitrogen to the potato acreage. 
 
Four other measures to reduce diffuse nitrogen pollution were considered. These were 
stocking density reduction (figure 2), a setaside
vii restriction (figure 3), a catchment 
wide input quota (figure 4) and emission taxation (figure 5). The results are consistent 
with those for input taxation i.e. the maintenance of river flow controls reduces the 
need to impose as strict a policy to control diffuse nitrogen pollution when compared 
to the absence of any irrigation limits. Under all regulatory regimes the distinction 
between the presence and absence of a river flow restriction is clear with the 
exception of stocking density reduction, where the difference is marginal.  
 
However, the ranking amongst the four river flow restrictions is not consistent. 
Irrespective of the pollution control policy, one would expect the tightest river flow 
restriction (90
th percentile) to result in the most diffuse pollution control followed by 
95
th and then 98
th percentile river flow restriction. The results are not entirely 
consistent in this regard due to certain rotational and livestock restrictions in the 
model. It seems that within the feasible region there are land, nitrogen and crop/soil 
allocations under the 95
th and 98
th percentile river flow restrictions which result in 
marginally less diffuse pollution than under the 90
th percentile restriction. This is not 
an error; rather it highlights the non-linearities in the bio-physical economic model. 
 Varying climatic conditions 
Predictions from UK CIP (2002) indicate that Scotland's climate will become wetter 
due to enhanced global warming over the period to 2050. The same policy 
simulations were therefore carried out under the ‘wet’ year weather scenario. Here, 
the difference in diffuse nitrogen pollution between any of the three river flow 
restriction and the absence of any flow restriction was insignificant (figure 6). It is 
plausible that irrespective of the river flow regime and irrigation type (optimal, 
restricted or un-irrigated), leaching rates are fairly similar due to the high volume of 
sub-soil drainage. Thus when rainfall is plentiful irrigation controls will not affect 
nitrogen input levels or the acreage of land irrigated. Therefore in terms of diffuse 
nitrogen pollution control in a wetter climate, the presence of river flow restrictions 
has a much lower impact on the shadow price of pollution control. However, note that 
the required nitrogen tax rate is higher under wet weather conditions than under mean 
conditions (figure 6), since more rainfall translates into higher leaching rates. 
 
Targeting of controls 
The question remains as to whether under existing weather conditions it is more cost 
effective to control diffuse pollution in the catchment with irrigation controls or 
through conventional instruments targeting the polluting input i.e. nitrogen. Suppose 
the regulatory objective was to ensure that the ambient nitrate standard of 50 mg/l was 
not violated more than 8 weeks of the year. In the absence of a river flow control this 
requires an input tax of 266% of the product price, whereas under a 95
th percentile 
river flow control the required input tax was 233% (for a market price of £0.42 pre 
kg). Under taxation, the resource cost (due to loss of profit) under no river flow 
control amounts to £24,140 whereas the resource cost with the lower tax rate required with river flow controls is £901,954. This is because flow controls mean the farmer 
can no longer grow as much highly-profitable potatoes. A policy which uses taxes to 
control nitrate pollution alone (i.e. disregarding river flow requirements) is much 
cheaper than one using a combination of lower taxes and river flow controls. But note 
that this addresses the problem purely from the viewpoint of nitrate pollution control, 
ignoring low flow problems.   
 
As a means to control diffuse pollution, river flow controls alone are not an efficient 
mechanism. The reduction in pollution in the presence of river flow controls was 
modest when compared to the reduced crop profitability. Whether this can be said of 
other irrigated crops depends on the crop’s input demand function for irrigation water, 
climate, and nitrogen leaching functions. It must also be noted that this analysis does 
not consider the transaction/implementation costs of imposing and monitoring 
percentile bans on river flow which may be higher than those of enforcing input 
taxation. Finally, due to the inclusion of existing agricultural support payments, losses 
in farm incomes as calculated by our model overstate the net social costs of 
alternative policies.  
 
Conclusions 
This study researched the efficient joint management of two agricultural externalities, 
i.e. diffuse nitrogen pollution in rivers and low river flows due to surface water 
extraction for irrigation. Overall we found that the presence of river flow restrictions 
contributed towards pollution mitigation and thus should be considered in the design 
of nitrogen control policies. However, as a means to control diffuse nitrogen pollution 
imposing river flow controls by themselves were not in themselves cost effective. Furthermore, minimum river flow restrictions did not influence optimal instrument 
level under wetter weather conditions. 
 
These results are hopefully of policy relevance in the context of legal requirements for 
integrated water catchment management under the EU water framework directive. 
However, more work needs to be done here: for example, to investigate whether these 
results are consistent across catchments of different size, differing dependences on 
irrigation and different land use patterns. Groundwater resources are also impacted by 
nitrate pollution and abstraction, yet were not included in our framework. Finally, a 
direct incorporation of uncertainty over future weather patterns could be attempted, 
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 Appendix 1: A Concise Mathematical Representation of the Model 
Regulatory objective  








cs c p a h l n w Q p ρ
ϖκ ϖκ  













− − ∑∑ ∑ µ λ η ϖκ ϖκ                     (EQ 1) 
Subject to: 
 
Secondary Expenses:  
= C ∑∑
cj








tz G - ∑∑
ix
ix i q
ϖκ ϖκ λ           (EQ 2) 
Crop production:    () cs cs
n
cs cs cs cs n y
cs 3 2 1 0 γ γ γ γ + + =             (EQ 3) 
Total output:      cs cs cs l y Q =                           (EQ 4) 
Grass production:    () () ts ts ts ts ts ts
ts g µ β β β β
µ 3 2 1 0 + + + =                     (EQ 5) 




tb b gl g G a ∑ ∑ =                              (EQ 6) 










σ                                           (EQ 7)                
Total grassland N (kg/ha):     ts ts o + = σ µ               (EQ 8)                




tsgl µ                                              (EQ 9) 










d                                         (EQ 10)     
Stocking density constraint:        d d
!
≤                      (EQ 11) 
Potato Production:    () ϖκ ϖκ η ϖκ ϖκ ϖκ ϖκ η ε ε ε ε ϕ
ϖκ
i i i i i i
i
3 2 1 0 + + + =     (EQ 12) 
Potato Quality/ Irrigation:      ) , ( ϖκ ϖκ ϖκ λ ϕ i i ij H h =                  (EQ 13) 
Potato irrigation constraints:      ϖκ λ λ i i
!
≤                                     (EQ 14) Bounds on land allocation :    t
s
ts t G gl G
!
≤ = ∑ ,  c
s
cs c L l L
!
≤ = ∑        (EQ 15) 






ts T u l gl ϖκ λ             (EQ 16)           






ts ts r r l r l ϖκ λ ψ     (EQ 17)   
Crop Nitrate load (kg/ha):     ()
ϖ δ ϖ ϖ ϖ δ δ cs cs cs cs cs n e 2 1 0 + =                      (EQ 18) 
Livestock Nitrate load (kg/ha):     ()
ϖ θ ϖ ϖ ϖ µ θ θ ts ts ts ts ts v 2 1 0 + =            (EQ 19)           
Potato Nitrate load (kg/ha):     ()
ϖκ ξ ϖκ ϖκ ϖκ η ξ ξ i i i i i x 2 1 0 + =                     (EQ 20)               
Overall River concentration (mg/litre):  
∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
+ + ℵ +




























x gl v l e
ϖκ ϖκ





          (EQ 21) 
Environmental Quality Constraint:    Θ ≤ ℘ ϖκ w                        (EQ 22) 
 
The regulator’s objective is to minimise the difference between the unrestricted 
catchment profit   ϖκ Π and the catchment profit under different pollution control 
policies. Where ϖ is the prevailing weather condition that year (dry, mean, or wet) 
and κ is the catchment river flow restriction (no flow restriction or 98,95 and 90%ile 
flow restriction) enforced by the regulator.  ϖκ Π for each ϖ κ combination is the 
outcome of an unrestricted run of the model without any regulation. Thus when 
considering a particular regulatory policy it remains constant and independent of the 
optimisation problem. The catchment profit in the objective function is defined as the 
return to the producer’s management and allocation of resources over the cost of total 
catchment nitrogen consumption {∑∑
cs
cs cs









n gl w µ (silage and grazing grass)} and all other 
secondary costs of farmingC . Where  c p is the market price of arable crop c ,  j ρ the 
market price of potato quality  j , and  b p is the market return from one grazing 
livestock unit (GLU) of livestock type b .  n w refers to the cost of nitrogen fertiliser, cs n and  cs l is the nitrogen applied and land allocated to arable crop c (excluding 
potatoes and grassland) con soil type s.  ts gl  and ts µ  refer respectively to land and 
nitrogen allocated to grassland type t (grazing and cutting), while  ϖκ λ i and  ϖκ η i refer 
to land and nitrogen applied to potato crop under irrigation regime i(optimal, 
restricted or un-irrigated). 
 
Secondary expenses C  (EQ 2) refer to all other catchment production costs excluding 
that of nitrogen fertiliser application:  () bm b bm k k f ,...... 1 =  is a vector of m  costs per 
unit of livestock type (b ) associated with feeding and other animal husbandry 
expenses,   () tu t tu z χ χ ,.... 1 =  is a vector of u  per hectare costs of grassland 
management,  () τ τ υ c c c v v ,...... 1 = is a vector of τ per hectare costs associated with the 
production of each arable crop type and  ( ) ϖ ϖ ϖ ω ω ix i ix q ,...... 1 =  is a vector of  xcosts per 
hectare associated with potato farming including irrigation costs under each weather 
condition.  
 
The crop production function equation set (EQ 3) yields the output (kg/ha) for each 
crop soil combination (the source of heterogeneity in the catchment) and is based on 
estimated coefficients  3 2 1 0 , , , cs cs cs cs γ γ γ γ . The grassland yield for both silage and 
grazing grass on all soil types is given by the EQ 5, where  3 2 1 0 , , , ts ts ts ts β β β β are 
estimated coefficients. EQ 6 ensures that the actual grazing grass and silage 
production meets the requirements of livestock numbers  b a . If EQ 11 is satisfied then 
livestock qualifies for certain grants and subsides which are accounted for in b p .  EQ 
15 is a constraint on the allocation of land, and ensures that the model allocation is 
similar to the actual situation on the ground. Most of these constraints were not 
binding.  EQ 16 ensures the land allocation to any soil type does not exceed the actual 
acreage of each soil type. EQ 17 is a representation of the two representative 
rotational constraints in the catchment. As the model only allows potato allocation on 
sandy soils,  ψ  = 0 for silty and loamy soils and 1 for sandy. 
     EQ 12 is a set of equations for every weather (ϖ ) and river flow restriction (κ  ) 
giving the potato yield per hectare under every irrigation regime i (optimal, 
restricted, and un-irrigated) for nitrogen application  i η . Where 
ϖκ ϖκ ϖκ ϖκ ε ε ε ε i i i i 3 2 1 0 , , , are estimated coefficients for the potato production function.  EQ 
13, converts potato crop yield into quality categories  j (scabbed and scab free), given 
the available irrigation water under each weather condition. EQ 14, limits the 
allocation of land to every irrigation category based on the available irrigation water.  
 
EQ 18 estimates the total nitrogen load (per ha)  cs E  for a total nitrogen application of 
cs n (per ha) based on the weather estimated coefficients ϖ ϖ ϖ δ δ δ cs cs cs 2 1 0 , , . Whereas EQ 
19 and EQ 20 provide the annual load per ha from Livestock/grassland ( ts V ) and 
potato ( i X ) based on the weather estimated coefficients  ϖ ϖ ϖ θ θ θ ts ts ts 2 1 0 , ,  and   
ϖκ ϖκ ϖκ ξ ξ ξ i i i 2 1 0 , ,  respectively. It is assumed that the nitrogen from animal waste 
allowed by MAFF regulation is applied to grassland.   b Λ is a vector of the estimated 
annual N content of one GLU of each livestock type. Therefore EQ  7 provides the 
per ha availability of Nitrogen from animal waste to grassland, which along with the 
artificial N fertiliser  ts o provides the total Nitrogen application to grassland  ts µ  per 
ha (EQ 8). The annual loads from EQ 18, 19, and 20 were converted into the average 
daily load for every week of a weather condition based on computations of NITCAT 




1 = Γ  is a proportionality vector of the 




w ∞ ∞ = Ω ,......, 1  a 
proportionality vector of the average daily grassland/livestock crop load for each 
week , and  ( ) ϖκ ϖκ ϖκ ϑ ϑ i
w
i i
w ,......., 1 = ∆  a proportionality vector of the average daily 
potato crop load from each irrigation regime for each week.  
 
Likewise the estimated daily average drainage (rainwater / rain + irrigation water) 
from each catchment activity ( ϖ
cs
wℵ arable crops, ϖ
ts
w#  grassland,  ϖκ
i
w" potatoes) 
for every week under all three weather conditions was calculated from the nitrate 
leaching model runs. EQ 21 gives the overall river concentration from farming activities at the mouth of the river assuming instantaneous mixing.  R w  is a rough 
approximation of daily river base flow for ever week under each weather and river 
flow restriction. Unit conversions have been ignored in EQ 21.  EQ 22 is the 
environmental constraint relating to river nitrate pollution, where Θ  is the standard. 
 
As the model was run for every weather condition and river flow control, the 
potato/irrigation variables, yield/leaching equations, and constraints varied 
accordingly. Similarly when a regulatory policy was considered corresponding 
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0 35.7 71.4 107 143 179 214 250 286 321 357
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90%ile flow restriction 95%ile flow restriction
98%ile flow restriction no flow restriction 
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0 0.78 1.55 2.33 3.1 3.88 4.65 5.43 6.2 6.98 7.75 8.53

























no flow restriction 95%ile flow restriction
98%ile flow restriction 90%ile flow restriction
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Wet weather 98,95,90% ile and no flow restriction
Mean weather 90% ile flow restriction 
 
   Note that the required nitrogen tax rate is higher under wet weather  
   conditions than under mean conditions FOOTNOTES 
                                                 
i By law a minimum requirement of 5 holdings of any activity per catchment must 
exist before disclosure, therefore not all the required data was made available. This 
meant approximating certain livestock values such as the stocking rate which was 
assumed to be 2.2 glu/ha. 
ii The 95%ile flow defines a flow exceeded naturally on 95% of days in a ‘average’ 
year (1989 – 1998 period) during which no abstraction took place.  
iii The 90%ile imposes the greatest restriction on irrigation extraction while 98
th 
percentile the least (i.e. the greatest river flow).  
iv For details on the potato growth model, naturalised flow estimation, reservoir 
storage, borehole capacity, irrigation dates, extraction points, application of flow 
related bans and other assumptions see Crabtree, et al. 
v The results were confirmed by using the MINOS 5 solver which yielded similar 
results within reasonable bounds. 
vi Limited livestock statistics were disclosed due to confidentiality issues. 
vii It is assumed that setaside land is not rotational. Rotational setaside is exacerbates 
diffuse nitrogen leaching. 